A century-old statute in Virginia that grants practicing attorneys serving in the General Assembly the power to delay court proceedings has once again come under scrutiny. The measure, designed to accommodate the demands placed on part-time lawmakers, provides broad authority for attorney-legislators to pause civil and criminal matters when their official duties in the state capital clash with judicial schedules.
The practical impact of the law is prominently illustrated in southwest Virginia, where the criminal proceedings against Buchanan County Supervisor Trey Adkins have remained stalled for more than four years. Adkins was indicted in May 2022 on 82 felony charges, yet his case has still not reached a jury trial nearly 54 months after the initial indictments were handed down.
The sweeping indictment against Adkins encompasses severe allegations of wrongdoing, including public property embezzlement, conspiracy, forgery, absentee-voting infractions, and election fraud. Adkins has consistently asserted his innocence regarding all 82 counts. Following years of procedural delays, his trial is now scheduled to take place on October 19 in Dickinson County.
Court records indicate that a significant factor in the protracted timeline has been the invocation of Virginia’s legislative-continuance protections. House Minority Leader Terry Kilgore, a Republican from Scott County who serves as one of Adkins' defense attorneys, utilized the statute at least three times across 2023 and 2024 to obtain trial postponements due to his legislative commitments. Kilgore did not respond to requests for comment regarding the scheduling maneuvers.
Enacted under Virginia Code § 30-5, the underlying statute has governed the state's legal and legislative landscape since 1919. The law establishes that state lawmakers, legislative staff, and the clients they represent possess an automatic right to stay judicial and administrative proceedings during timeframes surrounding General Assembly activity.
Under the statutory framework, qualified parties are granted continuances as a matter of right during a substantial window that starts 30 days prior to the commencement of any legislative session and concludes 30 days following its formal adjournment. This mandatory postponement window applies equally to both standard regular sessions and any special sessions called throughout the year.
The scope of the privilege extends well beyond the full legislative sessions held in Richmond. Lawmaker-attorneys can also claim continuances for standalone interim work, covering the day immediately preceding, the day of, and the day following any official meetings of legislative committees, commissions, or councils that the member is slated to attend.
The statute leaves trial judges with minimal discretion when an eligible legislator-lawyer requests a delay. If a presiding judge refuses to grant a qualifying motion for a continuance, the law explicitly classifies that refusal as reversible error, ensuring that any subsequent judgment can be overturned upon appeal by a higher court. The statute maintains a narrow exception only for temporary injunctions, which remain within the court's judicial discretion.
The longstanding rule has generated persistent debate across the Commonwealth's legal community. Critics and opposing counsel have argued that the broad protections can lead to excessive delays, leaving legal disputes unresolved for years and placing opposing litigants at an unfair disadvantage simply because the other party retained an elected official.
Despite occasional controversy, the procedural tool has seen consistent bipartisan utilization. Members on both sides of the political aisle, including prominent figures such as Democratic House Speaker Don Scott, have invoked the statutory protections to balance their public responsibilities with their private legal practices.
Supporters of the statute maintain that the measure remains essential for preserving Virginia’s traditional citizen legislature, wherein lawmakers must maintain outside careers while serving the public. Senate Majority Leader Scott Surovell, a Democrat from Fairfax and a practicing attorney, argued that the provision is vital to protect everyday clients from suffering disadvantages merely because their legal counsel holds public office.
Surovell emphasized that the unpredictability of both litigation and legislative duties makes the statutory shield a necessity. Without such protections, clients could be left without their chosen legal counsel when lawmakers are summoned to the capital to carry out state business. He noted that the primary focus of the rule is to safeguard the interests of the clients rather than the convenience of the attorneys.
At the same time, Surovell cautioned that lawmaker-attorneys should exercise restraint and only seek continuances when genuine scheduling conflicts occur between legislative functions and court appearances. He also observed that obtaining a delay does not universally benefit the client, as many defendants in criminal matters strongly prefer to have their cases heard and resolved in a timely manner.
Virginia's approach provides a markedly broader window of protection than rules in several other jurisdictions with citizen legislatures. In Florida, for instance, lawmakers are afforded court continuances for a period encompassing 15 days before and after sessions, alongside required committee meetings. Virginia’s 30-day buffer before and after legislative sessions is twice as long as the Florida benchmark.
The statutory framework has taken on added significance as the workload of Virginia's officially part-time legislature continues to expand throughout the calendar year. With legislative committees and specialized study commissions convening frequently between formal winter sessions, the intersection between legislative responsibilities and courtroom calendars has become an increasingly continuous dynamic in the state's justice system.
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